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 Conditional Innocence and the Myth of 
Consent: The Subtle Coercion of CERCLA’s 
Contiguous Property Owner Protection 
Trayce Hockstad* 
INTRODUCTION 
The roots of environmental regulation of private property for the benefit 
of the public began, for the Western world, more than 400 years ago in the form 
of personal litigation.1  It was the lone plaintiff who, through particular use of 
the nuisance suit, began to expand the scope of available legal remedies for 
ecological grievances – sometimes in defiance of procedural formalities of the 
English feudal court system.2  For centuries, common law courts remained the 
chief legal avenue for resolving environmental disputes between private par-
ties.3  American courts eventually labeled these suits as either nuisance4 or 
trespass actions.5  With the exception of a rare quarrel over interstate pollu-
tion,6 the burden of pursuing environmental regulation was largely left to the 
individual disgruntled plaintiff and the extent of his annoyance with his neigh-
bor. 
At the close of the nineteenth century, however, political and social poli-
cies began to influence the course of environmental litigation.  Judicial opin-
ions began to engage in equitable balancing between environmental and eco-
nomic concerns, with a heavy bias in favor of promoting a profitable national 
 
* Special thanks to Regional Counsel at Environmental Protection Agency, Region III 
and Office of General Counsel for including me on a challenging, rewarding explora-
tion of this issue in my final year as a law student. 
 1. See Cantrel v. Church (1601) 78 Eng. Rep. 1072 (establishing that a nuisance 
action for interference with a right of way could be brought and successfully argued 
“by a stranger, who hath nothing to do with the Land”). 
 2. See Aldred’s Case (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (Lord Coke).  William Aldred 
brought suit to prevent the spread of “corrupted air” emanating from a neighbor’s pig-
gery.  Id.  Although this type of suit was generally brought by a “novel disseisin” action, 
which provided a successful plaintiff with the remedy of a return to the status quo, 
Aldred successfully brought “an action on the case” so that he might be awarded dam-
ages.  DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 245 (2004). 
 3. Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of Environmental 
Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159, 161. 
 4. See, e.g., Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268 (1890) (“[N]o 
place can be convenient for the carrying on of a business which is a nuisance, and which 
causes substantial injury to the property of another.”). 
 5. See, e.g., Keppel v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 200 Pa. 649 (1901). 
 6. See New Jersey v. City of New York, 284 U.S. 585 (1931); New York v. New 
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Mis-
souri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
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market.7  Instead of following the traditional rule of granting injunctions for 
established nuisance activities,8 courts weighed the plaintiffs’ property inter-
ests against the social utility of the defendant’s action.9  This new method of 
analysis for common law nuisance actions, combined with the public health 
crises of the Industrial Revolution, released a wave of federal regulatory legis-
lation across the United States.10  The first decade of the twentieth century saw 
the introduction of laws aimed as equally at regulating trade as guarding public 
health, such as the Lacey Act of 1900,11 the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906,12 
and the Insecticide Act of 1910.13  But after World War II, Congress began to  
target private industries solely on the basis of environmental concerns, specif-
ically for pollution control.14  A fear that the world had become a nuclear test 
zone filled with untold amounts of seeping radioactive waste fanned the flame 
of federal regulatory legislation.15 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the modern notion of environmental 
regulation began to take shape.  New statutes like the National Environmental 
 
 7. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in America 
Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1159, 1177–84 (1986) (describ-
ing the development of the “balancing of conveniences” doctrine in Pennsylvania 
courts).  Bone criticizes the application of the doctrine as follows: “Damages could not 
adequately compensate for a residential plaintiff’s injury since the value of plaintiff’s 
property right could not be measured in monetary terms.  Denying injunctive relief in 
residential plaintiff cases in effect reduced the value of the nonfungible residential use 
to a fungible quantity.”  Id. at 1178. 
 8. Jared A. Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 
485, 493 (2010) (noting that abatement was “ordinarily required” after establishing a 
nuisance “regardless of how profitable or important the nuisance-making activity 
was”). 
 9. See, e.g., Richard’s Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 107, 114 (1868) (holding that injunc-
tion was not appropriate to prevent an iron smelter from discharging soot over a plain-
tiff’s land because the iron works represented a $500,000 investment and employed 
more than 1,000 men). 
 10. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. 
L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (1986) (crediting the rise of administrative law in the 1960s and 
70s and increasing federal regulation to a “response to unanticipated economic crises, 
emerging risks to public health and safety, and shifting public sentiments towards dis-
advantaged classes”); see also the White Phosphorous Matches Act, Pub. L. No. 62–
118, 37 Stat. 81 (1912) (taxing the use of white phosphorous in match manufacturing 
to prevent disease outbreak). 
 11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–78 (2018). 
 12. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). 
 13. Pub. L. No. 61-152, 36 Stat. 331 (1910). 
 14. See Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). 
 15. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contem-
porary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1157 (1995). 
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Policy Act,16 Endangered Species Act,17 Clean Air18 and Clean Water19 
Amendments, Toxic Substances Control Act,20 and Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (“RCRA”)21 established clear precautionary measures for pro-
tection of natural resources and public health.  But these acts did little to ad-
dress the thousands of sites, scattered across the United States, already filled 
with chemical byproducts from years of experimental technological testing.  In 
response to a growing national concern after events like the Love Canal disas-
ter,22 Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) in 1980.23 
Since its adoption, CERCLA has been the subject of substantial, ongoing 
litigation.  The original legislative purpose of CERCLA was to empower the 
government to apportion liability among parties responsible for the thousands 
of abandoned landfills that threatened public health and safety.24  Perhaps the 
most controversial aspect of CERCLA is its imposition of strict liability on a 
wide range of individuals who previously owned or currently own polluted 
land.25  The broad sweep of this liability has been tempered, in some respects, 
by subsequent additions of affirmative defenses.  While the statute imposes 
strict liability on those who have caused or may have caused the release of 
hazardous waste into the environment, it also correctly exempts otherwise in-
nocent contiguous landowners whose property has become contaminated by 
migrating pollution.26  This exemption is conditioned, however, on the prop-
erty owner’s guarantee of “full cooperation, assistance, and access” to persons 
conducting response actions on site for the duration of the operation.27  Refusal 
 
 16. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970). 
 17. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973). 
 18. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). 
 19. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). 
 20. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976). 
 21. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976).  RCRA sets out a framework for 
proper management of solid waste, both hazardous and non-hazardous.  Id. 
 22. In 1978, a canal, which had been converted by the Hooker Chemical Company 
to a landfill for hazardous waste, exploded after the area received a record amount of 
rainfall.  Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, EPA J. (Jan. 1979), https://ar-
chive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/love-canal-tragedy.html.  Hazardous waste leaked into the 
groundwater causing chemical burns, birth defects, and widespread environmental de-
struction.  Id. 
 23. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
ch. 103 (2018)); see also 42 U.S.C. ch. 103 [hereinafter CERCLA]. 
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 1 (1985). 
 25. Christopher D. Man, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Settling Potentially Re-
sponsible Parties in the Allocation of CERCLA Liability, 27 ENVTL. L. 375, 376 (1997) 
(“[CERCLA] is widely criticized as unfair because it imposes retroactive, strict, and 
joint and several liability upon a broad class of persons whom Congress has deemed 
‘responsible’ for hazardous waste contamination.”). 
 26. CERCLA § 9607(q)(1)(A). 
 27. Id. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(iv). 
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to grant access to government agents necessarily results in the loss of the af-
firmative defense and the possibility of CERCLA liability for any cleanup costs 
or damages from the hazardous waste.28 
This Article examines the relationship between the conditional status of 
innocence CERCLA offers under the contiguous property owner provision and 
the Fifth Amendment right of landowners to receive just compensation for gov-
ernmental taking of private property.  It specifically argues that, under current 
law, innocent landowners pay a high price for release from CERCLA liability.  
Access to property of contiguous landowners is generally obtained through the 
consent of the owner.  But while consenting to government access for response 
actions preserves the shield to CERCLA liability, it also often prevents the 
landowner from successfully bringing a suit for just compensation if the use 
and enjoyment of his or her land are destroyed by the government’s continued 
access.29  In other words, a property owner whose land is contaminated through 
no personal fault (and potentially through the fault of the government itself) 
may be forced to choose between liability for the hazardous waste under 
CERCLA and the loss of the right to exclusive control of the land, even if the 
owner is not compensated for the government’s occupation of the property.  
Consequently, CERCLA’s contiguous property owner defense requires inno-
cent landowners to surrender their constitutional rights to bring Fifth Amend-
ment compensation claims against the United States.  The conditions of this 
affirmative defense create a subtle coercion that may technically survive judi-
cial scrutiny but contradicts the public policies of both waivers of constitutional 
rights and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.30 
The easiest solution to this problem is to amend CERCLA’s requirements 
for the contiguous property owner defense to exclude the grant of full, perpet-
ual access to contaminated property.  It is unlikely that many landowners will 
refuse to cooperate with the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA’s”) re-
medial procedures, even without compensation, but removing the coercive 
conditions of the statute would allow the statutory defense to serve its intended 
purpose of protecting innocent property holders without compelling them to 
surrender ownership rights.  Owners would be free to entertain other options 
for remedial action, negotiate access agreements with the government, and – 
perhaps most importantly – accurately assess the cost of unrestricted govern-
ment access as cleanup efforts perpetuate.31 
 
 28. See id. 
 29. See infra Section III.A. 
 30. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine restricts the government’s ability to 
condition the receipt of benefits generally held out to the public or qualifying individ-
uals on surrender or compromise of a constitutional right.  Such situations are prone to 
amount to government coercion.  See B&G Enters. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 523, 
527 (1999). 
 31. The diminution in the value of private property by loss of the right to exclude 
the government has been recognized by the federal government many times.  See, e.g., 
Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“In the bundle of rights 
we call property, one of the most valued is the right to sole and exclusive possession – 
4
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I. CERCLA’S COERCIVE REPUTATION: THE HUNT FOR PRPS 
A. From CERCLA to Superfund 
Almost as soon as CERCLA was adopted, legislators realized they had 
underestimated the problem posed by hazardous waste sites across the nation.  
The initial scope of the statute was a five-year, $1.6 billion program to address 
“orphan” dump sites – which, by EPA estimates in 1980, affected one in six 
groundwater systems serving less than ten thousand persons and one of every 
three larger systems.32  By 1985, however, some estimates put the number of 
abandoned hazardous waste sites in the United States as high as 20,000.33  The 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce described the issue as follows: 
[In 1980,] most believed that cleaning up a site was relatively inexpen-
sive and involved removing containers or scraping a few inches of soil 
off the ground . . . . 
Today, five years later, our understanding of the problem posed by 
abandoned hazardous chemicals is entirely different.  The [EPA] Office 
of Technology Assessment now estimates there may be as many as 
10,000 Superfund sites across the Nation, or an average of 23 sites per 
Congressional district . . . .  We now understand that a cleanup fre-
quently goes far beyond simple removal of barrels.  It often involves 
years of pumping contaminated water from aquifers.34 
In light of the discovery of the magnitude of hazardous waste sites and 
the expense of remedial action, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”) of 1986.35  SARA extended certain 
CERCLA initiatives and authorized extra funding over the next eight years.36  
Furthermore, SARA established the right of potentially responsible parties 
(“PRP”s) to seek contribution from other PRPs, thus opening the door for third 
party interpleading.37  Just as the scope and term of CERCLA’s applicability 
expanded to match the unanticipated gravity of the nation’s pollution situation, 
so too the nature of CERCLA liability began to expand. 
CERCLA was a departure from the traditional model of twentieth-century 
federal regulatory legislation in at least one crucial way: it was not truly regu-
latory.  Instead of establishing a supervisory program, Congress created a 
 
the right to exclude strangers, or for that matter friends, but especially the Government.” 
(alteration in original)); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The essence 
of all property is the right to exclude . . . .”). 
 32. S. REP. NO. 99-11, at 2 (1985). 
 33. Id. 
 34. H.R. REP. NO. 99-253, pt. 1, at 54–55 (1985). 
 35. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986). 
 36. Id. at 1645. 
 37. Id. at 1647–48. 
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framework for imposing strict liability for past and present hazardous sub-
stance releases.38  The ultimate goal of CERCLA was to promote expedient 
and efficient remediation of polluted sites.39  Accordingly, the statute provided 
EPA with a range of options to motivate response efforts.  For instance, EPA 
may issue an administrative order to direct a responsible party to abate the dan-
ger of a hazardous substance release,40 obtain injunctive relief to order the 
abatement, or undertake the abatement itself using Superfund resources and 
then sue the responsible party for reimbursement.41  The federal government is 
also permitted to delegate cleanup decisions to the states or to impose state 
standards for remedial procedures when “applicable” or “relevant and appro-
priate.”42  But federal to state delegation rarely happened in the early years of 
CERCLA enforcement,43 perhaps because of the all-encompassing nature of 
the statute’s liability scheme. 
There are four categories of PRPs contemplated under CERCLA: (1) cur-
rent owners and operators of sites responsible for the release of hazardous 
waste; (2) former owners or operators of the sites at the time waste disposal 
occurred; (3) any person who arranged for the disposal of the waste; and (4) 
any person who accepted the hazardous waste for transport.44  Essentially, any 
party who participated in the process of creating or disposing of hazardous 
waste is on the hook for the cost of cleanup, whatever that may be.45  Further-
more, current owner liability exists regardless of whether the owner had any-
thing to do with the original pollution; a person who purchases property con-
taminated sixty years ago is still potentially liable today for that hazardous 
waste.46 
Liability for hazardous waste pollution under CERCLA is not only strict 
but also, in some cases, joint and several.  Unless the harm is divisible, liability 
for cost recovery actions brought under § 107(a) is joint and several,47 while 
 
 38. Percival, supra note 15, at 1163. 
 39. Jasmine M. Starr, Note, Making Good Neighbors: Liability for Passive Migra-
tion of Hazardous Waste Under CERCLA, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 435, 439 (2004). 
 40. CERCLA § 9606 (2018). 
 41. Id. § 9607. 
 42. Id. § 9621(d). 
 43. Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good For-
tune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1534–35 (1995). 
 44. CERCLA § 9607(a). 
 45. See Michael V. Hernandez, Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the 
Controversy over CERCLA Claims Brought by Potentially Responsible Parties, 21 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 90–92 (1997) (noting two types of actions for enforcing 
liability on PRPs: (1) cost recovery claims of a non-PRP cleanup agent against a PRP 
under § 107(a) of CERCLA and (2) contribution claims of one PRP against another 
under § 113(f)).  Some courts have further delineated the allocation of liability in vari-
ous claims of PRPs brought against other PRPs.  See id. at 106–13. 
 46. See Starr, supra note 39, at 440. 
 47. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 171–72 (4th Cir. 1988). 
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liability for contribution actions brought under § 113(f) is several only.48  In 
1983, the United States sought reimbursement from twenty-four defendants for 
the costs of remedial action at the disposal site of the Chem-Dyne treatment 
facility.49  The defendants, who were collectively involved in different stages 
of the generation and transport of hazardous waste, argued that they should not 
be held jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs.50  The court held, instead, 
that the deletion of references to joint and several liability in the final version 
of Superfund was not intended to reject joint and several liability but “to have 
the scope of liability determined under common law principles, where a court 
. . . will assess the propriety of applying joint and several liability on an indi-
vidual basis.”51 
In 1986, CERCLA was held to be retroactive in its imposition of liabil-
ity.52  In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical Co., the government 
brought an action, under RCRA, against a pharmaceutical company for ille-
gally disposing of drums containing hazardous waste.53  The disposal took 
place in 1979 and the government’s action was originally commenced in Au-
gust of 1980.54  However, in August of 1982, the government amended its 
complaint to allege retroactive liability under CERCLA, which had been en-
acted after the commencement of the suit.55  Despite the defendant’s contention 
that its conduct was neither negligent nor unlawful at the time it occurred in 
1979, and the fact that nothing in the statute expressly provided for retroactiv-
ity, the court found that CERCLA liability applied to pre-enactment conduct.56 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, CERCLA’s reputation was solidified 
as a coercive imposition of inescapable liability on an enormous pool of PRPs.  
In 1986, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that suits for 
recovery of costs of removal and remedial actions were regarded as actions for 
restitution and, consequently, no right to jury trial attached to these proceed-
ings.57  District courts subsequently split as to whether a right to jury trial ex-
isted for contribution claims under CERCLA § 113(f).58  The only appellate 
court that addressed the issue held that a § 113(f) claim was essentially equita-
ble and no right to jury trial attached.59 
 
 48. Hernandez, supra note 45, at 84. 
 49. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
 50. Id. at 804. 
 51. Id. at 808. 
 52. United States v. Ne. Pharm. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 53. Id. at 729–30. 
 54. Id. at 730. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 732–33. 
 57. Id. at 729. 
 58. Compare Am. Cyanamid Co. v. King Indus., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 209, 213–15 
(D.R.I. 1993) (finding no right to jury trial), with United States v. Shaner, No. 85–1372, 
1992 WL 154618 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1992) (finding a right to jury trial). 
 59. Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co. Conn., 59 F.3d 400, 414 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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B. Conditional Innocence Under the Small Business Liability Relief 
and Brownfields Revitalization Act 
At the end of the twentieth century, environmental legal scholars in-
creased their outcry against CERCLA for unfairly penalizing anyone who 
owned or had ever owned land contaminated by hazardous waste disposal 
sites.60  The result was that many of these sites, known as “brownfields,” were 
largely neglected by the private developers who could most afford to purchase 
and rehabilitate them.61  In 2002, Congress addressed the rising concern that 
the far reach of CERCLA’s liability scheme had set back the original legislative 
purpose of cleaning up and restoring hazardous waste sites across the United 
States by enacting the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revi-
talization Act (“Small Business Liability Protection Act”).62  The Small Busi-
ness Liability Protection Act instituted a variety of exemptions to Superfund 
accountability.63 
Although SARA had established an innocent purchaser defense, the de-
fense did not promote investment in brownfields because it only applied to 
owners who had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the polluted na-
ture of the property at the time of purchase.64  The Small Business Liability 
 
 60. See Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116, 1129 (N.D. 
Fla. 1995) (“While it may seem inequitable, the mere migration of contaminants from 
adjacent land constitutes disposal for the purposes of CERCLA, and passive down-
stream landowners are liable for the cleanup costs resulting from their neighbors’ ac-
tivities.”); Colin Crawford, Medical Monitoring and the Future of CERCLA: Reinvig-
orating the Superfund Law’s Consequentialist Purpose, 28 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 839, 840 
(1996) (“People with different political philosophies and divergent views on the appro-
priate role of environmental protection nonetheless often agree that various CERCLA 
provisions, and in particular its imposition of joint and several liability, are an unjust 
practice.”); Melody A. Hamel, Comment, The 1970 Pollution Exclusion in Compre-
hensive General Liability Policies: Reasons for Interpretations in Favor of Coverage 
in 1996 and Beyond, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1083, 1122 (1996) (“The strict liability scheme 
of CERCLA is often criticized as flawed and unfair.”). 
 61. David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs As Laboratories of Democracy?, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 86, 92 n.19 (2005) (noting that voluntary brownfields programs 
existed “in the shadow of – and substantially because of the threat of – coercive regu-
lation such as CERCLA”); Larry Schnapf, Sweeping CERCLA Amendments Will Affect 
Brownfields, Prospective Purchasers, 33 ENVTL. REP. 264, 266 (2002) (“The CERCLA 
definition of a ‘facility’ includes any area where hazardous substances have come to be 
located.  As a result, property owners have been concerned that they could be held liable 
for contamination that has migrated onto their property . . . .  This potential liability has 
discouraged development of brownfield sites.”). 
 62. Pub. L. No. 107–118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002) [hereinafter Small Business Lia-
bility Protection Act]. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See Starr, supra note 39, at 442–43. 
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Protection Act created new defenses for brownfield redevelopers and contigu-
ous property owners65 to “provide incentives for investors to purchase and re-
develop . . . usually vacant or mothballed parcels of industrial or commercial 
property in economically depressed downtown urban areas that sit idle out of 
fear by potential investors that the property is possibly contaminated.”66  Sec-
tion 221 of the Small Business Liability Protection Act amended § 107 of 
CERCLA by exempting landowners whose property is contiguous to and con-
taminated by a release of a hazardous substance from the property of another 
from PRP status.67 
The contiguous property owner defense, however, requires that the con-
tiguous landowner (1) not have caused the contamination; (2) not be affiliated 
with the contaminating party in any type of agency capacity; (3) exercise due 
diligence at the time of purchase and be unaware of contamination; and (4) take 
reasonable steps to stop any continuing release and prevent future release.68  
Nestled in the middle of these expected and unremarkable qualifications, how-
ever, is a requirement that the landowner cooperate with the response actions 
ordered by the government.  Section 107(q)(1)(A)(iv) conditions the availabil-
ity of the defense on whether 
the person provides full cooperation, assistance, and access to persons 
that are authorized to conduct response actions or natural resource res-
toration at the vessel or facility from which there has been a release or 
threatened release (including the cooperation and access necessary for 
the installation, integrity, operation, and maintenance of any complete 
or partial response action or natural resource restoration at the vessel or 
facility).69 
Shortly after CERCLA was amended to include the contiguous property 
owner defense, commentators speculated that the new language actually ex-
panded the liability of adjacent landowners.70  Instead of relying on what ap-
peared to be the common interpretation of the statute – that an otherwise inno-
cent landowner could not be held accountable for his neighbor’s pollution – the 
Small Business Liability Protection Act planted a legal minefield through 
which a landowner must successfully navigate (or, alternatively, fail) to qualify 
for the affirmative defense.  Whereas a PRP attempting to install monitoring 
wells on a neighbor’s contaminated contiguous property had previously been 
 
 65. See Small Business Liability Protection Act § 221. 
 66. AMCAL Multi-Hous., Inc. v. Pac. Clay Prods., 457 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1028 
(C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 67. CERCLA § 107(q)(1)(A). 
 68. Id. § 107(q)(1)(A)(i)–(iii), (v)–(viii). Compliance with information requests 
and reporting requirements is also a condition of the defense.  Id. 
 69. Id. § 107(q)(1)(A)(iv). 
 70. See Schnapf, supra note 61, at 267 (“It has been a rare instance when a prop-
erty owner whose property has been impacted by a plume migrating from an off-site 
source has been held liable under CERCLA.”). 
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required to pay for such access as part of its good faith requirements under an 
administrative or consent order, the amended language placed the burden on 
contiguous landowners to exercise “appropriate care” in preserving their de-
fenses – a phrase many believed coerced a grant of access.71  This necessary 
grant of access to the contiguous landowner’s property to avoid liability for 
hazardous waste pollution immediately aroused Fifth Amendment concerns.72  
These concerns are justified based on the applicable law and policy of cases at 
the intersection of Fifth Amendment takings and environmental regulatory ju-
risprudence. 
II. A BRAND NEW GAME: ACCESSING AN INNOCENT OWNER’S LAND 
A. Carefully Constructed Consent 
Sections 104(b) and (e) of CERCLA are designed to enable EPA easy 
access to a PRP’s property for purposes of both gathering information required 
to assess response actions and carrying out such actions.73  PRPs are required 
to provide EPA with requested information and to permit EPA to enter con-
taminated sites, inspect them, and to take samples of soil, water, and other 
things.74  In the event a PRP denies required access, EPA may either issue an 
administrative order to prohibit interference with entry or go to court to obtain 
compliance with its request for entry.75  Should the court determine that non-
compliance with a request for access has been “unreasonable,” it may assess a 
civil penalty of up to $25,000 for each day that access was denied to the gov-
ernment.76  In short, CERCLA compels access to the contaminated properties 
of PRPs to conduct response and remedial actions and to prevent the release of 
hazardous waste. 
Contiguous property owners who do not fall under PRP status, and whose 
land does not contain the source (or “plume”) of contamination, cannot chal-
lenge a remediation order in federal court once access to land is granted and a 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
 
Presumably, a contiguous owner will have to allow access to PRPs to conduct 
response actions in order to be deemed to have exercised “appropriate care” and 
no longer be able to demand compensation as a condition for access to the prop-
erty.  It is quite possible that a court may conclude that a contiguous property 
owner who denies access to PRPs to conduct response actions or refuses to al-
low institutional controls to be placed on property because of inadequate com-




 73. See CERCLA § 9604(b), (e) (2018). 
 74. Id. § 9604(e). 
 75. Id. § 9604(e)(5). 
 76. Id. § 9604(e)(5)(B)(ii). 
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remedial plan of action is issued.77  Historically, courts have held that § 104(e) 
authorizes entry on adjacent properties in order to reach a contaminated site 
and to carry out an approved response activity.78  However, if the purpose of 
the access is to determine whether remedial action is warranted at all, and no 
emergency circumstance allows for response agents to enter,79 the authority of 
EPA to access property hinges on the consent of the landowner.80 
CERCLA requires EPA to request the consent of landowners before pur-
suing other options to access property.81  Although EPA retains the more time-
consuming option of issuing a unilateral demand for access if it is reasonable 
to believe that the contiguous property poses a threat of rerelease of the haz-
ardous substance into the environment,82 the reasonableness of such demands 
may then be challenged in court.83  EPA guidance documents specifically ex-
plain the importance of consent as follows: 
Consent is the preferred means of gaining access for all activities be-
cause it is consistent with EPA policy of seeking voluntary cooperation 
from responsible parties and the public . . . . 
. . . 
If practicable under the circumstances, consent to entry should be me-
morialized in writing . . . .  Although oral consents are routinely ap-
proved by the courts, a signed consent form protects [EPA] by serving 
as a permanent record of a transaction which may be raised as a defense 
or in a claim for damages many years later.  If a site-owner is unwilling 
to sign a consent form but nonetheless orally agrees to allow access, 
 
 77. United States v. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d 596, 601 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 78. United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 682 F. Supp. 1260, 1273 (D. 
Mass. 1988). 
 79. See CERCLA § 9606(a); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 697 F. Supp. 89, 95–
96 (D. Conn. 1988) (discussing the “imminent and substantial endangerment” stand-
ard). 
 80. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d at 601 (“[D]istinguishing between cases in which the 
agency either is rightfully on the land to perform remedial measures or does not have 
to be on the land because the order is directed to the landowner . . . and cases in which 
the agency must get access to the land to execute remediation.”).  The court denied the 
request based on “very limited evidence of an environmental hazard that . . . [EPA] has 
put forward to justify its request for an access order,” because if the “ground for going 
on the property is to undertake remedial measures, the court cannot perform its duty of 
determining whether the agency’s proposed action is arbitrary or capricious without 
considering whether the measures proposed are a reasonable basis for authorizing what 
would otherwise be a trespass.”  Id. at 601–02. 
 81. Reeves Bros. v. EPA, 956 F. Supp. 665, 673 (W.D. Va. 1995) (citing CERCLA 
§ 9604(e)(5)(A)). 
 82. See CERCLA § 9604(e)(3)(C). 
 83. Tarkowski, 248 F.3d at 601 (“[W]hen an access order is sought, judicial juris-
diction clicks in; the arbitrary and capricious standard clicks in”). 
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EPA should document this oral consent by a follow-up letter confirming 
the consent.84  
For the vast majority of cases involving preliminary investigations of 
properties, EPA relies on simple, one-page consent forms signed by landown-
ers.85  These documents include both general grants of property access to EPA 
personnel for the purpose of taking samples and drilling boreholes for soil and 
groundwater collection, as well as catch-all provisions for “other inquiry ac-
tions at the property as may be necessary to determine nature, extent and po-
tential threat to human health and the environment.”86  EPA guidance docu-
ments reject attempts to negotiate the terminology and conditions of entry be-
cause of the risk of imposing compensation obligations on EPA.87  If consent 
is denied, EPA personnel are instructed to “explain EPA’s statutory access au-
thority, the grounds upon which this authority may be exercised, and that the 
authority may be enforced in court.”88 
In the event that EPA agents are successful in persuading a landowner to 
sign a consent form (a high likelihood if the discussion includes the loss of the 
contiguous property owner defense and potential imposition of liability for 
thousands of dollars in cleanup costs or fees for denial of access), the form will 
reflect that the owner “g[a]ve this written permission voluntarily with the full 
knowledge of [his or her] right to refuse and without threats or promises of any 
kind.”89  Two parts of this statement are likely to be untrue for contiguous 
property owners.  First, while a property owner may have had “full knowledge” 
of the right to not sign the form, it is much less likely that he or she knowingly 
signed away the ability to bring a successful claim for compensation against 
 
 84. Memorandum from Thomas L. Adams, Jr., Assistant Admin’r EPA, to RPA 
Regional Admin’rs 4, 6 (June 5, 1987), https://www.epa.gov/sites/produc-
tion/files/2013-09/documents/cont-access-mem.pdf) [hereinafter OSWER Directive]. 
 85. See e.g., EPA, CONSENT FOR ACCESS TO PROPERTY, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/tba-access-form.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
 86. Id. 
 87. OSWER Directive, supra note 84, at 7. 
 
Persons on whose property EPA wishes to enter often attempt to place condi-
tions upon entry.  EPA personnel should not agree to conditions which restrict 
or impede the manner or extent of an inspection or response action, impose 
indemnity or compensatory obligations on EPA, or operate as a release of lia-
bility.  The imposition of conditions of this nature on entry should be treated as 
denial of consent and a warrant or order should be obtained. 
 
Id. 
 88. Id. at 6. 
 89. CONSENT FOR ACCESS TO PROPERTY, supra note 85. 
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the government for any damage to, or prolonged use of, the property.90  Sec-
ond, if the property owner did sign the consent form with such knowledge, it 
is highly unlikely that the permission was truly given voluntarily.91 
B. Why Waiver Won’t Work 
The policy behind waiver of constitutional rights is essential to under-
standing whether an innocent landowner has been coerced into granting access 
that destroys his or her right to bring a compensation claim against the govern-
ment.  For several reasons, EPA’s consent to access forms signed by property 
owners cannot be construed as waivers of a right to later sue the government 
for, specifically, the right to demand just compensation from the government 
if private property is taken for public use.92 
Although parties may validly contract to waive due process rights in both 
civil and criminal contexts, an agreement to surrender a fundamental right is 
never presumed.93  In both civil and criminal matters, courts must indulge 
“every reasonable presumption against waiver” of a constitutional right.94  Ac-
cordingly, courts must be able to positively determine the presence of language 
surrendering a known right95 and should avoid finding an implicit waiver of 
any constitutional privilege.96 
In Cienega Gardens v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit addressed whether a waiver of a takings claim was implicit in 
a use agreement entered into between the government and private parties pur-
suant to a housing project.97  The government argued that the private parties 
waived their right to bring a takings claim by acknowledging the receipt of 
valuable and sufficient consideration as part of an alleged release agreement.98  
 
 90. See Roger D. Schwenke, Regulatory Access to Contaminated Sites: Some New 
Twists to an Old Tale, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 749, 750 (2002) 
(“Many landowners also probably believe that when an agency demanding access goes 
too far, they are protected by their right to assert a claim of there being a ‘taking’ of 
their property.  However . . . that right and opportunity is very limited.”). 
 91. Id. at 750 n.4 (“[T]here is very little real voluntary ‘consent’ associated with 
many such documents received by EPA.”). 
 92. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 93. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186 (1972). 
 94. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). 
 95. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (finding no waiver when “the con-
tractual language relied upon does not, on its face, even amount to a waiver”).  
“[W]aiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 96. Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2007) (“In any event, waiver of 
a constitutional right must be clear and unmistakable.”); Ricker v. United States, 417 
F. Supp. 133, 139–40 (D. Me. 1976) (“To be effective, waiver of a constitutional right 
must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made.”). 
 97. 503 F.3d 1266, 1273–74 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 98. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 434, 463–64 (2005), vacated by 
503 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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The court rejected the government’s argument and refused to find that there 
was an implicit waiver of the private parties’ right to bring takings claims con-
tained in the use agreements.99 
Similarly, other circuit courts have held that, to be effective, a waiver 
must purposefully release a right one knows that he or she possesses and that 
it is highly unlikely that a valid release can be inferred absent any express man-
ifestation.100  An effective waiver requires actual and complete knowledge of 
the nature of the right and also of the consequences of surrender.101  Therefore, 
a valid waiver cannot occur if the party does not understand that consenting to 
government access will bar any claim for compensation if remedial measures 
destroy the value of the property. 
Furthermore, any ambiguity concerning a waiver of a constitutional right 
is strictly construed in favor of preserving the right.102  Contractual waivers are 
assessed on a number of factors, including whether (1) unequal bargaining 
power exists between the parties; (2) both parties appreciated the importance 
and full impact of the waiver; and (3) the party waiving its right received con-
sideration in return.103  Courts will also examine the clarity and precision of 
the contractual provision in determining whether the waiver was knowingly 
 
 99. Cienega Gardens, 503 F.3d at 1273. 
 100. See, e.g., Hatfield v. Scott, 306 F.3d 223, 229 (5th Cir. 2002) (“Constructive 
consent to a waiver is not generally associated with the surrender of constitutional 
rights.”); Lake James Cmty. Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Burke Cty., 149 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 
1998).  The Fourth Circuit qualified valid contractual waivers of constitutional rights 
as follows: 
 
The contractual waiver of a constitutional right must be a knowing waiver, must 
be voluntarily given, and must not undermine the relevant public interest in or-
der to be enforceable.  Under these principles, courts have routinely enforced 
voluntary agreements with the government in which citizens have, for example, 
given up the right to sue through releases and covenants not to sue the govern-
ment. 
 
Id. at 280. 
 101. Hatfield, 306 F.3d at 229–30 (noting the holder of the right must possess “ac-
tual knowledge of the existence of the right or privilege, full understanding of its mean-
ing, and clear comprehension of the consequence of the waiver”); see also Cullen v. 
Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 105 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding the plaintiff did not waive the right to 
present his claims to an Article III court unless he “possessed an awareness” that he 
was waiving that right); Erie Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1096 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (waiver of a constitutional right must be made “with full understanding of 
the consequences” of the waiver). 
 102. Urban Developers LLC v. City of Jackson, 468 F.3d 281, 306 (5th Cir. 2006); 
see also Gete v. INS, 121 F.3d 1285, 1293 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that principles gov-
erning waiver of constitutional rights apply equally in criminal and civil contexts). 
 103. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, at 187–88 (1972). 
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made.104  If a party to the document is not expressly made aware of the signif-
icance of a waiver provision in an agreement, the waiver is unlikely to be con-
sidered valid.105 
Combining these factors with the government’s burden to prove the pro-
priety of seeking the waiver makes it highly unlikely that a typical EPA consent 
to access form could be a valid and knowing waiver of a constitutional right.106  
Unfortunately, safeguards against forfeiture of a constitutional right only seem 
to apply if the agreement is explicitly labeled a “waiver,” not if it merely func-
tions as one.  Therefore, while it may be very difficult for a landowner to waive 
the right to bring a takings claim based on judicial safeguards, it is fairly easy 
to accomplish the same result through consent.  Most consent to access agree-
ments have been interpreted as providing the government with an affirmative 
defense rather than as waivers of the property owner’s right to sue.107  Conse-
quently, while a plaintiff may file suit notwithstanding having signed a consent 
agreement, the government can use the agreement as a bar against recovery.108  
Even though an executed consent to access form will not constitute a knowing 
relinquishment of the landowner’s right to sue the government, this agreement 
can operate as the functional equivalent of a waiver. 
III. COERCION OR CONTRACT: LOSING THE INVERSE CONDEMNATION 
CLAIM 
A. The Danger of Consent 
What happens if the government’s remedial action has destroyed the use 
and enjoyment of a contiguous property owner’s land?  If the government has 
“taken” a landowner’s private property for public use, the remedy is to seek 
 
 104. See, e.g., Weaver v. N.Y. City Emps.’ Retirement Sys., 717 F. Supp. 1039, 
1045 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding a violation of plaintiff’s due process rights because a 
notice of termination of benefits was “so confusing that a reasonable lay person would 
not have known that he had an opportunity in fact to contest defendants’ finding”). 
 105. See, e.g., Ricker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 133, 139–40 (D. Me. 1976) 
(finding a violation of property owners’ due process rights as (1) there was no waiver 
because a signed mortgage did no more than state the government’s right to foreclose 
on the property and (2) even if the language might be construed as a waiver, the gov-
ernment made no showing that the owners were actually made aware of the significance 
of the fine print relied on as a waiver of constitutional rights). 
 106. Emmert Indus. Corp. v. City of Milwaukie, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1178–79 
(D. Or. July 7, 2006) (“[T]he government must demonstrate the propriety of seeking a 
waiver of a constitutional right in light of both its legitimate interest in a waiver, if any, 
and the benefit to be conferred upon the adverse party.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Scogin v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 291 (1995); Kirby Lake 
Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 829, 844 (Tex. 2010). 
 108. See, e.g., Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd., 320 S.W.3d at 844. 
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just compensation under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause109 or the Tucker 
Act.110  The Takings Clause is “designed to bar [g]overnment from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”111  It is not necessary that the gov-
ernment take physical possession of the property for a taking to be found, only 
that the owner lose most of his or her interest in, or enjoyment of, the prop-
erty.112  When the government acts in its eminent domain capacity, the impli-
cation is that it has appropriated the private property of an owner for some 
ulterior purpose without the owner’s consent.113 
The same is true for inverse condemnation claims in which a landowner 
seeks compensation for the government’s use of his or her private property 
before any official condemnation proceedings have been instituted.114  To 
avoid potential takings liability, government agencies often try to postpone 
condemnation by seeking the consent of the landowner to access the prop-
erty.115  The landowner’s consent (or lack thereof) to the government’s actions 
is crucial to the success of the inverse condemnation suit.116 
Most disputes involving the interplay between landowner consent and in-
verse condemnation claims have been resolved in state courts.  Several state 
court opinions have held, pursuant to both federal and state takings clauses, 
that lack of consent is a prerequisite for establishing a successful inverse con-
demnation or takings claim.117  In City of Cibolo v. Koehler, landowners in 
 
 109. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”). 
 110. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (2018) (providing jurisdiction in the Court of Federal 
Claims for takings actions against the United States). 
 111. Penn Ctr. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (quoting Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 112. Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 1386, 1391 (Fed. Cl. Ct. 1970).  
The specifics of what types of governmental actions constitute physical and regulatory 
takings are beyond the scope of this Article.  For a thorough breakdown of the current 
status of typical EPA response actions and what amounts to a government taking, see 
Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (1991). 
 113. Seneca Nation of Indians v. New York, 206 F. Supp. 2d 448, 533 (W.D.N.Y. 
2002); see also Warner/Elektra/Atl. Corp. v. Cty. Of DuPage, 991 F.2d 1280, 1284 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (“Laws authorizing condemnation entitle a governmental entity . . . to take 
private property for its own use without the owner’s consent.” (emphasis added)). 
 114. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980). 
 115. See OSWER Directive, supra note 84, at 4. 
 116. See 8 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G14E.01 at n.6 (Matthew Bender, 3rd. 
ed.) (“Implicit in an inverse condemnation claim is the notion that the government ac-
tion at issue was without the landowner’s consent.”). 
 117. See, e.g., Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth., 320 S.W.3d 
829, 844 (Tex. 2010) (“A person who consents to the governmental action cannot val-
idly assert a takings claim.”); Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 254 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Neb. 
1977) (“Eminent domain is defined generally as the power of the nation or a state, or 
authorized public agency, to take or to authorize the taking of private property for a 
16
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Texas brought a takings claim against the city for construction of a drainage 
channel across their property.118  The city claimed that a drainage easement 
agreement signed by the landowners had “conclusively negate[d] the Koehlers’ 
takings claim as a matter of law because . . . the easement conclusively estab-
lishe[d] that the Koehlers consented to the easement . . . .”119  The court allowed 
the Koehlers to present their claim only because they had challenged the valid-
ity of the easement agreement itself and prevented the city from conclusively 
establishing consent.120  The court relied on article 1, § 17 of the Texas Con-
stitution121 in noting that “if the [d]rainage [e]asement were not void, [the 
Koehlers] would likely be unable to establish absence of consent . . . .”122 
In Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, a federal district court followed 
Supreme Court of California precedent in recognizing that consent is a defense 
to an inverse condemnation suit but the scope of consent is dispositive of an 
inverse condemnation suit.123  The consent defense failed in Yamagiwa be-
cause the city was unable to prove that the plaintiff consented to the exact use 
the city made of her property.124  The court held that while consent functions 
as a defense to an inverse condemnation claim in much the same way as a tres-
pass or nuisance action, “the applicability of the defense turns on the con-
sent.”125  The court accordingly based its determination of whether a taking 
had occurred on the scope of the consent given by the plaintiff – if the govern-
ment had not acted outside of that scope, the plaintiff would have no right to 
compensation.126 
 
public use without the owner’s consent . . . .”); Ponderosa Domestic Water Improve-
ment Dist. v. Van Wyck, No. 1 CA–SA 15–0251, 2015 WL 6696816, at *2 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. Oct. 29, 2015) (“Any waivers or consents the District has obtained may constitute 
‘affirmative defenses’ to inverse condemnation claims by [land]owners relating to the 
taking.”); VLX Props. v. S. States Utils., Inc., 792 So.2d 504, 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (finding no taking of pond water for storage when the owner consented to the 
use); Rahm v. Mo. Pub. Serv. Co., 676 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (finding 
prior property owners had consented to the challenged land use and “any entitlement 
for damages for trespass or inverse condemnation ceased”). 
 118. No. 04–11–00209–CV, 2011 WL 5869683, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 
2011). 
 119. Id. at *5. 
 120. Id. at *7. 
 121. TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (“No person’s property shall be taken, damaged, or 
destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, un-
less by the consent of such person . . . .”).  Other state courts have relied on similar 
language in takings clauses of their constitutions.  See, e.g., Huard v. Town of Pelham, 
986 A.2d 460, 466 (N.H. 2009) (“Under Part 1, Article 12 of the New Hampshire Con-
stitution, ‘[n]o part of a man’s property shall be taken from him, or applied to public 
uses, without his consent.’”). 
 122. Koehler, 2011 WL 5869683, at *5. 
 123. 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1104–05. 
 126. Id. 
17
Hockstad: Conditional Innocence
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019
110 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
In McElmurray v. Augusta-Richmond County, the Court of Appeals of 
Georgia relied on both state127 and federal128 precedent to hold that property 
owners who consent to government action cannot obtain an inverse condem-
nation remedy.129  The federal precedent, Janowsky v. United States, held that, 
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, a taking never occurs “when the property 
owner agrees to allow his property to be used by the government.”130  The 
judgment in Janowsky was vacated in 1998 by the Federal Circuit because the 
court found that there was evidence that the “consent” at issue had been co-
erced.131  The court in McElmurray considered this case “reversed in part on 
other grounds” and still relied on the original Janowsky analysis of consent 
when addressing the takings claim at issue.132 
Other than the language in Janowsky, few federal cases have expressly 
addressed the role of consent in an inverse condemnation claim.  Two opinions 
from the late 1990s, however, offer conflicting viewpoints on the issue.  In 
Scogin v. United States, a landowner operated a wood treatment facility on 
fifty-three acres of land and 4,000 feet of navigable waterway in the Bayou 
Bonfouca in Slidell, Louisiana.133  After the Bayou Bonfouca site was listed 
on the Superfund National Priorities List (“NPL”) in 1983, EPA asked for ac-
cess to Scogin’s contiguous, uncontaminated land.134  Eventually, the plaintiff 
signed an agreement allowing EPA access to investigate and monitor ground-
water readings for two months but would not extend the grant any further.135 
After a unilateral order compelled access to the property for a length of 
time beyond the two months necessary to carry out the cleanup remedy, Scogin 
 
 127. 618 S.E.2d 59, 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).  In Barwick v. Roberts, the Supreme 
Court of Georgia held that a plaintiff’s express consent to the use of his property de-
feated his claim under the Georgia constitution takings provision; “Private property 
shall not be taken, or damaged, for public purposes, without just and adequate compen-
sation being first paid.”  16 S.E.2d 867, 870 (Ga. 1941).  Even though this provision 
does not expressly state that consent is a part of analysis, the court concluded it was so.  
Id. 
 128. McElmurray, 618 S.E.2d at 63. 
 129. Id. at 63–64. 
 130. 23 Cl. Ct. 706, 716–17 (1991), rev’d in part, vacated in part 133 F.3d 888 
(Fed. Cir. 1998).  Timothy Janowsky agreed to assist the FBI in an undercover investi-
gation that involved the use of Janowsky’s vending company as a front for the opera-
tion.  Id. at 707.  When the government refused to buy the vending company after the 
conclusion of the project, despite having allegedly promised Janowsky that it would, 
Janowsky brought an inverse condemnation suit.  Id.  The court held that property own-
ers who voluntarily deliver property to the government and later seek compensation 
may have a remedy through contract principles but cannot maintain an inverse condem-
nation claim.  Id. at 711–12. 
 131. Janowsky v. United States, 133 F.3d 888, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 132. McElmurray, 618 S.E.2d at 62 n.2. 
 133. 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 286 (1995). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 286–87. 
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negotiated a lease with a contractor for EPA at the site.136  Later, when Scogin 
attempted to bring suit alleging a taking of his land, the court held that the lease 
agreement “appear[ed] to constitute a consent to the governmental activity on 
his property” and, consequently, meant that any damages recovered would be 
reduced by the amount of compensation provided pursuant to the lease.137  The 
court, in dicta, stated that an owner’s grant of permission to another to access 
his property means “the ‘right to exclude’ has been relinquished and not 
taken.”138  Scogin has been subsequently interpreted to mean that a land-
owner’s consent to government access and activity on property defeats a later 
claim for compensation.139 
In 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York 
reached the opposite conclusion.  In Juliano v. Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie 
Solid Waste Management Authority, Albert and Judene Juliano brought an in-
verse condemnation claim against a New York Public Authority (“MOSA”).140  
MOSA had been given the power to condemn real property within its area of 
operation for the establishment of a solid waste facility.141  The plaintiffs 
signed an agreement with MOSA in which they were compensated $1,000 for 
a grant of access for entry and testing of their premises.142  MOSA subse-
quently installed monitoring wells on the property and designated it as a poten-
tial site for a proposed sanitary landfill.143  The plaintiffs eventually brought 
suit for both a regulatory taking of their property through MOSA’s designation 
and a physical taking through the installation of the monitoring wells.144  The 
court dismissed the regulatory taking claim as unripe145 but held that the plain-
tiffs’ land had been taken through the installation of the monitoring wells.146 
MOSA argued that the signed testing agreement evidenced valid consent, 
which limited any subsequent damage claims.147  The court noted that, alt-
hough the plaintiffs’ decision to enter into the testing agreement appeared fa-
cially voluntary, the fact that New York eminent domain law “deprived 
[p]laintiffs of the power to refuse” access negated even the possibility of con-
sent.148  The plaintiffs’ argument was that they had been coerced into signing 
 
 136. Id. at 288. 
 137. Id. at 293. 
 138. Id. at 292. 
 139. See Schwenke, supra note 90, at 791; see also Textainer Equip. Mgmt. v. 
United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 211, 218 (2011). 
 140. 983 F. Supp. 319, 321–22 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 322. 
 143. Id. at 323. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 324. 
 146. Id. at 328. 
 147. Id. at 329. 
 148. Id. 
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the testing agreement because they would have been compelled to comply with 
the request regardless.149  The court agreed: 
A material distinction exists between a consent form freely entered into 
and an agreement entered into that contemplates activities on 
[p]laintiffs’ property which, but for MOSA’s statutory authority to 
force entry, [p]laintiffs would not have allowed . . . .  In the present 
case[,] New York [e]minent [d]omain [l]aw section 404 authorized a 
mandatory physical occupation of [p]laintiffs’ property.  Accordingly, 
sufficient evidence exists to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether [g]overnment compulsion was present, thus obviating 
[p]laintiffs’ consent.150  
Several scholars have advocated for this distinction between consent 
granted based on knowledge of the government’s ultimate right to compel co-
operation and other forms of consent “freely entered into.”151  Unfortunately, 
however, while Juliano clearly calls into question the validity of such consent, 
most courts have adopted the rationale in Scogin – holding that even the most 
technical and nominal indication of consent defeats an otherwise meritorious 
inverse condemnation claim.152  The distinction in Juliano has been largely 
rejected in lieu of holding that a grant of access agreement is a valid contract 
and not coercive merely because the United States is a party.153 
B. How Sovereign Did It Seem? 
Beyond the scope of explicit inverse condemnation claims, federal courts 
have considered whether parties can voluntarily consent to similar agreements 
with the government.  A line of federal case law indicates that the government 
is generally not liable for a taking when it acts in a proprietary capacity as a 
 
 149. Id. at 322 n.1. 
 150. Id. at 329. 
 151. See, e.g., Schwenke, supra note 90, at 750 n.4. 
 152. See, e.g., BMR Gold Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 277, 283 (1998); Tex-
tainer Equip. Mgmt. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 211, 218 (2011). 
 153. Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 359–60 (2006). 
 
Even were judicial takings cognizable, it is hard to fathom how a consent decree 
could meet the requirements for a taking, among which is the presence of a 
compelled acquiescence.  Such decrees are hybrids – part order, part contract – 
and obviously reflect the agreement of the parties, often to provisions that 
would be beyond the power of the court to impose without the parties’ consent. 
 
Id.; see also Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986); Johnson v. 
United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 648, 654 (2001), aff’d, 317 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2003); SEC 
v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 290 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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mere party in a contractual relationship.154  The dispositive determination is 
the extent to which the government acts in its “sovereign” capacity.155 
In Textainer Equipment Management v. United States, the government 
leased storage containers from the plaintiffs through a third party but failed to 
return all of the rented materials by the end of the lease.156  The lease, however, 
provided a buyout option at a reduced governmental rate for any containers that 
were not returned to the plaintiffs.157  When the buyout condition was acti-
vated, the plaintiffs brought a takings claim against the United States for the 
unreturned containers.158  Relying on the dicta in Scogin,159 the court held that 
“[w]here a property owner grants the government permission to use or occupy 
the plaintiffs’ property by agreement, the government’s use or occupation of 
that property does not give rise to a taking.”160  The court concluded that to 
prove a taking, the plaintiffs had to show that the government had appropriated 
some property other than that which had been addressed in the lease.161 
When analyzing the sovereign acts doctrine, it is important to distinguish 
between the government’s role as a party to a consensual agreement acting in 
 
 154. See Textainer, 99 Fed. Cl. at 218 (“The government has not taken property 
where it acts in its proprietary capacity pursuant to a contract right; to effect a taking, 
the government must act pursuant to its sovereign powers or invoke sovereign protec-
tions.”); see also Janicki Logging Co., Inc., v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 338, 346 
(1996) (holding that there was no taking when the Forest Service “acted in a proprietary 
capacity as a party to a contract and purported to exercise its rights for which it bar-
gained”). 
 155. Textainer, 99 Fed. Cl. at 218. 
 156. Id. at 212. 
 157. Id. at 212–13. 
 158. Id. 
 159. 33 Fed. Cl. 285, 291 (1995) (“[A] property owner relinquishes the right to 
exclude when the owner consents to the entry, use, and occupation of subject prop-
erty.”). 
 160. Id. at 218; see also J.J. Henry Co. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1246, 1249 (Ct. 
Cl. 1969). 
 
The clear thrust of the authorities is that where the government possesses prop-
erty under the color of legal right, as by an express contract, there is seldom a 
taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  The amendment has limited appli-




 161. Textainer, 99 Fed. Cl. at 218–19; see also BMR Gold Corp. v. United States, 
41 Fed. Cl. 277, 282–83 (1998) (dismissing a plaintiff’s takings claim when he had 
consented to the Marine Corp’s access to his property because “[a]lthough the right to 
exclude others from one’s property is a compensable Fifth Amendment interest, a prop-
erty owner relinquishes the right to exclude when the owner consents to the entry, use, 
and occupation of the subject property.”). 
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its proprietary capacity and as a regulator acting in its sovereign capacity.162  
Generally, only sovereign acts are subject to the Takings Clause.163  Although 
rights arising out of a contract with the government are “protected by the Fifth 
Amendment,”164 if rights are voluntarily created by contract, a takings theory 
has a limited application.  If the government interferes with contractual rights, 
the appropriate claim is generally one for breach of contract, not a takings 
claim.165  Most case law concerning the intersection of contract and takings 
claims addresses the contractual claims first and holds that if a claimant is suc-
cessful on a breach of contract claim, he or she cannot then recover on a takings 
theory.166  It thus follows that if the government does not perform some action 
beyond the scope of consent granted in a consent-to-access form, a plaintiff 
cannot recover for breach of contract.  At the same time, the plaintiff may not 
be able to recover through inverse condemnation or takings claims.167 
In Stockton East Water District v. United States, the plaintiff brought a 
claim against the government for breach of the contractual terms related to cer-
tain water restrictions.168  After determining that the government had not 
breached the contract,169 the court held that the government had acted primarily 
in its commercial (or proprietary) capacity and not as a sovereign regulator; 
therefore, the plaintiffs could not assert a takings claim.170  The same has been 
held in cases where the issue of the government’s breach was not addressed 
prior to a dismissal of the takings claim.171  A minority approach restricts this 
 
 162. David W. Spohr, (When) Does a Contract Claim Trump a Takings Claim? 
Lessons from the Water Wars, 2 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 125, 136 (2012). 
 163. Nwogu v. United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 637, 661 (2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part 497 Fed. App’x 952 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Envtl. Safety Consultants, Inc. v. 
United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 77, 100 (2010). 
 164. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934). 
 165. St. Christopher Assocs. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1376, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2008); 
see also Baggett Transp. Co. v. United States, 969 F.2d 1028, 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1992); 
Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
 166. See Stockton E. Water Dist. v. United States, 583 F.3d 1344, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); Castle v. United States, 301 F.3d 1328, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Hughes 
Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  No 
language from these opinions indicates that this prioritization is an application of the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine. 
 167. Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc., 271 F.3d at 1070 (holding that when parties 
validly contract with the government “remedies arise from the contracts themselves, 
rather than from the constitutional protection of private property rights”). 
 168. 75 Fed. Cl. 321, 324 (2007), modified in part, 76 Fed. Cl. 497 (2007), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part 583 F.3d 1344. 
 169. Id. at 363–64 (2007). 
 170. Id. at 373–74. 
 171. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 532, 535 
(2005) (holding that the “availability of contract remedies is sufficient to vitiate a tak-
ings claim, even if it ultimately is determined that no breach occurred” and that the 
takings claim was “entirely subsumed within the contract claim,” even where the gov-
ernment successfully asserted a defense). 
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“either/or” constraint of claims to situations where a plaintiff first recovers in 
contract,172 but most courts focus on the availability of a claim and not the 
result.173 
As long as the relationship between the individual and the government is 
purely a matter of contract and the government is not believed to be acting in 
its sovereign capacity, the government acts solely in its proprietary capacity.174   
Recourse for any disagreement will then be limited to pursuing a breach of 
contract action, not a suit based on a taking.175 
C. Finding Fifth Amendment Coercion 
The question becomes, in what circumstances has a party validly con-
tracted with the government such that a takings claim is negated?  When is the 
consent in question truly free of coercion from the overbearing threat of 
CERCLA liability and enforcement?  Where coercion exists there cannot be 
consent.176  To prove coercion, a party must show (1) that some wrongful act 
or threat from the other party to the transaction and (2) that the party was over-
come by fear and “precluded from using free will.”177  Courts look at the total-
ity of the circumstances to determine whether consent was truly a product of 
the individual’s free choice and not a submission to some overbearing force of 
authority.178 
For consent to be valid in a Fourth Amendment analysis, the government 
must usually show that the consent was not only “unequivocal” and “know-
ingly given” but also given without coercion, “implied or express.”179  There 
 
 172. See, e.g., Henry Hous. Ltd. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 250, 256 (2010); Con-
sumers Energy Co. v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 152, 158 (2008); System Fuels, Inc. v. 
United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 163, 172–73 (2005); see also Detroit Edison Co. v. United 
States, 56 Fed. Cl. 299, 300–02 (2003) (holding that a plaintiff must actually win a 
breach of contract claim to warrant dismissing a takings claim). 
 173. Spohr, supra note 162, at 146. 
 174. Janicki Logging Co., Inc., v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 338, 346 (1996). 
 175. Hughes Commc’ns. Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001).  “Taking claims rarely arise under government contracts because the 
[g]overnment acts in its commercial or proprietary capacity in entering contracts, rather 
than in its sovereign capacity.”  Id. 
 176. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).  See generally Gouled 
v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921) (holding that misrepresentation, overt coer-
cion, intimidation, fraud, trickery, and deceit vitiate consent). 
 177. Hsue Tung v. Peters, No. AW–09–576, 2009 WL 5206627, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 
23, 2009). 
 178. United States v. Garcia, 56 F.3d 418, 422 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“[T]he question whether a consent . . . was 
in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express of implied, is a 
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.”). 
 179. United States v. Jeter, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1347 (D. Utah 2005). 
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are many clear acts of coercion, such as threats of detention or arrest.180  How-
ever, in a Fifth Amendment context, the distinction between persuasion and 
coercion – which determines the presence or absence of a taking – is “highly 
fact-specific and hardly simple to determine.”181 
Economic coercion has been held to exist only where the landowner had 
“no alternative but to submit to it” – even when the government threatens to 
impose large fines for (allegedly) unreasonable denial of access or the eco-
nomic liability of CERCLA responsibility for the spread of hazardous waste.182  
Even though the threatening of a judicial penalty for withholding consent has 
been deemed coercive, the mere presence of a signed consent form is consid-
ered to suggest voluntariness to the agreement.183  For example, in United 
States v. Ownbey Enterprises, Inc., Ownbey, a small oil company in Georgia, 
challenged a previously entered into consent order with EPA on the grounds 
that the owner had signed the agreement under duress and coercion.184  Own-
bey claimed that the threat of “exorbitant fines” prevented him from exercising 
his constitutional right to challenge the validity of the consent order.185  The 
court ruled that the possible imposition of fines could not be considered a form 
of coercion because the amount and imposition of the fines were at the discre-
tion of the court rather than EPA.186  Furthermore, the fact that defendant did 
not understand the scope of EPA’s legal authority to issue unilateral orders did 
not constitute duress because EPA made no illegal threat of action – a required 
finding for the presence of duress.187 
The court ultimately held that a defendant is not coerced into a contract 
merely because the defendant was reluctant to agree to the terms, the terms 
were unfavorable for him, or the negotiating process was unfair because of the 
parties’ unequal bargaining power.188  Instead, the court held that Ownbey had 
the viable option of not agreeing to the consent order and forcing EPA to issue 
a unilateral order that could have been contested in a judicial proceeding.189  
 
 180. Cuviello v. City of Stockton, No. CIV. S–007–1625 LLK/KJM, 2009 WL 
9156144, *17 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009). 
 181. A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 182. Lee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 34 F.3d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 183. Eidson v. Owens, 515 F.3d 1139, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 184. 789 F. Supp. 1145, 1149, 1151 (N.D. Ga. 1992).  The court’s opinion names 
the company as the defendant, although it addresses the owner’s interactions with EPA 
in what is presumably an agency capacity.  See id. at 1147–48.  For purposes of its 
holding, the court made no mention of the degree to which a company’s rights are co-
extensive with that of the owner.  See generally id. 
 185. Id. at 1149. 
 186. Id. at 1152. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
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The fact that the defendant had two very clear alternatives showed that he was 
not forced to sign the consent order.190 
In Janowsky v. United States, the Federal Circuit suggested that there may 
be more to the distinction recognized in Juliano between agreements freely 
entered into and the “coerced consent” in contracts negotiated with the govern-
ment, which have the power to compel its ultimate desired result.191  The Jan-
owskys entered into a contract with the government to assist in an FBI investi-
gation, which would involve use of the Janowskys’ vending machine busi-
ness.192  The parties exchanged a number of agreements that reflected the fact 
it would be necessary for Mr. Janowsky to sell his business after the conclusion 
of the operation.193  It was agreed that if the business appraised for less than 
$300,000, the FBI would pay Janowsky the difference between the appraisal 
and that amount.194  Before any agreement was officially signed, but after Jan-
owsky was inadvertently exposed as a FBI informant, his continued coopera-
tion in the investigation was secured through the FBI’s threat that it would 
withdraw protection of Janowsky and his family if he pulled out of the opera-
tion.195 
The Janowskys sued the FBI, alleging that the government took their 
vending machine business without just compensation.196  The trial court found 
that the Janowskys acted voluntarily and that no takings claim could exist in 
such circumstances.197  However, on appeal, the court held the Janowskys were 
coerced because their protection was conditioned upon Mr. Janowsky’s con-
tinued participation in the operation.198  The court further held that, although 
the Janowskys did not necessarily have a right to FBI protection, the FBI “co-
ercively interfered with the Janowskys’ property right” in their vending busi-
ness by threatening to withhold protection.199 
IV. A NOTE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE 
The conclusion of the Janowsky opinion offered one further insight into 
the takings analysis issue on appeal.  In addressing the validity of Mr. Jan-
owsky’s consent, the court recognized that his agreement to work with the FBI 
in the sting operation had been conditioned on the government’s protection of 
 
 190. Id.; see also United States v. Hajduk, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1227 (D. Colo. 
2005) (finding defendants’ consent lawful even when the government stated prior to 
the consent agreement that a sampling box was to be installed on defendants’ property 
regardless of consent, and defendants did not have an option to refuse). 
 191. See generally 133 F.3d 888 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 192. Id. at 889. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 890. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 892. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
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his family.200  The court then noted that this situation likely implicated the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine.201  Although no person is entitled to receipt 
of a government benefit, there are restraints on the government’s ability to deny 
citizens receipt of federal benefits.202  For instance, the government may not 
withhold a benefit from a citizen for any reason that infringes on his or her 
constitutionally protected interests.203  A person therefore cannot be required 
to surrender a Fifth Amendment right to receive just compensation for a gov-
ernmental taking in exchange for a discretionary benefit if the benefit is unre-
lated to the property.204 
Regarding benefits that are related to the property, the government may 
encourage and obtain participation in federal regulatory programs by offering 
“attractive incentive[s]” or “threatening to withdraw” federal benefits based on 
participation.205  Compliance with a condition attached to a federal benefit will 
not usually be considered federal coercion.206  Where states or individuals are 
free to accept or reject the offered benefit, Congress may attach lawful condi-
tions to the benefits.207  However, when there is a communication of a required 
condition for receipt of a benefit, courts often examine language of the com-
munication at issue to determine if it is coercive.208  While documents that use 
“should” or “may” clearly communicate that “there has been no order compel-
ling the [party] to do anything,”209 the use of compelling language (such as 
“must”) in government communications suggests coercion.210 
 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
 203. Id. (citing Perry, 408 U.S. at 597). 
 204. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). 
 205. Adolph v. FEMA, 854 F.2d 732, 736 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 206. Id. (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937)). 
 207. See B&G Enters. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 523, 527 (1999) (finding that 
FEMA could not be charged with an unconstitutional taking because no “unconstitu-
tional conditions [were] attached to the benefits” of the NFIP program and “coercion 
by the [g]overnment” was not present). 
 208. See, e.g., Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am. v. FDIC¸ 132 F. Supp 3d 98, 121 
(D.D.C. 2015). 
 209. Holistic Candlers & Consumers Ass’n v. FDA, 664 F.3d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir. 
2012); see also In re Diamantis, No. 13-11201, 2014 WL 1203182, at *6 (U.S. Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2014) (finding no coercion or duress where a debtor signed an 
agreement in order to retain disability benefits after communications with employer 
were found to be “necessary to explain the debtor’s options and to solicit his agree-
ment”). 
 210. See Schwenke, supra note 90, at 750 n.4 (stating there is “very little real vol-
untary consent” present in these agreements). 
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CONCLUSION 
Since its inception, the scope of CERCLA has been expanding in response 
to the needs and concerns of the nation, but it has been simultaneously plagued 
by its coercive reputation.  The far-reaching scope of its liability scheme has 
been tempered by a variety of conditional defenses for cooperative landowners.  
The current state of the contiguous property owner defense adopted in the 
Small Business Liability Protection Act presents adjacent landowners who are 
victims of migrating hazardous substances with an unconscionable option.  The 
only way to avoid the imposition of CERCLA liability caused by a third party, 
including potentially the government itself,211 is to grant free and unrestricted 
access to EPA and other response agents for the duration of the approved re-
medial measures. 
However, most landowners do not understand the significance of the one-
page, non-negotiable consent-to-access forms they are offered by EPA.  Sign-
ing one of these forms likely destroys the ability to ever bring a successful 
takings or inverse condemnation claim, regardless of the nature or duration of 
the government’s occupation of the property.  While such a forfeiture of a con-
stitutional right should invoke “full knowledge” requirements and other pre-
sumptions against the finding of a valid surrender, these safeguards will likely 
not apply because the agreement is not technically a waiver. 
The landowner is, therefore, pigeonholed into asserting the defense of co-
ercion to challenge the validity of the agreement.  However, this defense is not 
likely to succeed given the voluntary wording contained within the govern-
ment’s grant of access forms and court precedent viewing such agreements as 
contracts where the government merely acts as one party to a transaction.  Un-
less the landowner is able to prove that the government acted outside of its 
proprietary capacity, even an objectively unfair agreement will be enforced 
against the property owner. 
The result of this setup is that a contiguous property owner is functionally 
compelled to grant the government unrestricted access to the owner’s land, 
thereby effectively relinquishing the right to seek just compensation while sim-
ultaneously facing the imposition of liability for hazardous waste, which the 
landowner possibly had no knowledge of or part in disposing.  CERCLA’s 
contiguous property owner defense is conditioned on what is, at best, extremely 
questionable consent in its voluntariness and scope.  However subtle, this co-
ercion still haunts the statute and the innocent landowners affected by it. 
The simplest correction to avoid setting this trap for innocent landowners 
is to remove the grant of full and unrestricted access to contaminated properties 
from CERCLA’s list of requirements for the contiguous property owner de-
fense.  EPA would still be free to negotiate with landholders for grants of ac-
cess but would do so without threatening to impose liability for hazardous 
waste if the access is not given without compensation.  While many landowners 
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will likely be willing to grant EPA access to clean up contaminated property 
even without a promise of compensation, eliminating the statute’s coercive 
land access requirements would give the defense its proper effect of protecting 
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